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ABSTRACT 
 
Frequently, local opposition to new housing development is based on fiscal concerns. Previous 
research (Nakosteen et al., 2003; Nakajima et al., 2007; Burnet et al., 2012) has found that these 
concerns are frequently misplaced since they assume that the additional expenses will be equal to 
per capita local cost associated with new residents, particularly the costs associated with K-12 
education, rather than the marginal cost. This working paper builds upon this work by revisiting 
six of the eight communities examined by Nakajima et al. (2007) and examining whether the 
state fiscal impacts of new housing development are large enough to offset negative local fiscal 
impacts when they do occur. Our analysis of these six cases finds that, in the aggregate, the six 
new developments generated considerably more state tax revenue than any actual local revenue 
shortfalls. Overall, we find that only 31 percent of the net new state tax revenue generated by the 
developments would be needed to completely offset the negative fiscal impacts experienced by 
three of the six communities. This suggests that the positive state fiscal benefits of new housing 
development are more than sufficient to support a state fund to guarantee that communities will 
be made financially whole in the event they allow the development of housing that meets 
regional and statewide needs, but find themselves fiscally disadvantaged as a result. These 
findings also imply that more thoughtful and evidence-based local and regional planning could 
minimize the chance of negative local fiscal outcomes associated with new housing 
development. 
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Introduction 
For well over a decade, housing production in Massachusetts has not kept up with 
population changes, resulting in significant affordability problems across the state.1 One thing 
that stands in the way of the state’s residential housing market is the Commonwealth’s archaic 
zoning and land-use regulations.2 These regulations, along with the centuries-old New England 
tradition of local control over land use, allow communities to readily resist the development of 
new housing, notwithstanding larger regional and statewide needs for more housing production. 
Frequently, local opposition to new housing development is based on concerns about 
fiscal impacts, particularly the impact on school enrollment and the expected costs of providing 
municipal services to new residents and their children. However, the common assumption that 
new housing development results in a net fiscal loss for cities and towns is not always borne out 
in the actual experiences of the Massachusetts communities that have agreed (or have been 
required through state laws like Chapter 40B) to develop affordable and market-rate housing.3 
Admittedly, this seems very counter-intuitive. After all, new housing means new 
residents, those new residents consume municipal services, and those services are not free. In an 
environment in which per pupil expenditures in many communities are well in excess of the 
average property tax payment, how could it be otherwise? 
                                                 
1 See Koshgarian et al., Foundation for Growth: Housing and Employment in 2020, UMass Donahue Institute 
(2009). http://www.massgrowth.net/writable/resources/document/foundationforgrowth_scopea_final_10_29_10.pdf 
2 For an in-depth discussion of consequences of these regulations, see Glaeser, Schuetz, and Ward, Regulation and 
the Rise of Housing Prices in Greater Boston, Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston 
(2006).http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/68821/1248094/version/1/file/regulation_housingprices.pdf 
3 See https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVII/Chapter40B (especially chapter 20-23) 
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Part of the answer is that the cost of providing 
services to each additional resident isn’t always equal to 
the per capita cost, but rather the marginal cost of 
providing these services.4 In other words, adding new 
students to the school system only costs more money if 
you need to expand the capacity of your schools to serve 
those students. If you have extra seats in your classrooms 
and on your school buses, the marginal costs to the 
community of serving additional students are significantly 
less than the per capita costs.5 
This, of course, does not mean that adding 
additional housing, residents, and school-age children will 
never require additional funds to meet the service needs 
of the new members of the community (see Sidebar: 
Assessing district capacity to accept new students). In 
these cases, it seems reasonable to expect that the state 
should step forward and help to “make them whole” 
financially if it expects them to approve new housing 
developments. The relevant provisions of Massachusetts 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion, see Nakosteen et.al., The Fiscal Impact of New Housing Development in Massachusetts 
(2003).  https://www.chapa.org/about-chapa/chapa-publications/fiscal-impact-new-housing-development-
massachusetts-critical-analysis 
5 For the statistical analysis modeling the relationship between expenditures, enrollment, and capacity, the town of 
Shrewsbury was removed since it is an extreme outlier and exerts a disproportionate influence on the estimation of 
the regression equation.   
Enrollment and Expenditures 
in Massachusetts 
District enrollment capacity matters.  
When we define capacity as the ability 
of the district to add more students 
without hiring additional teachers or 
increasing class size*, we find that:   
 
The effect of school enrollment on 
district expenditures has a statistically 
significant dependence on whether or 
not the school district is operating at 
or above its enrollment capacity (p-
value = 0.02).  
 
On average, a 1% increase in 
enrollment in a school district without 
capacity is associated with a 0.91% 
increase in expenditures. 
 
On average, a 1% increase in 
enrollment in a school district with 
capacity is associated with a 0.65% 
increase in expenditures. 
 
Key message: The cost of adding 
new students to school districts with 
capacity is lower than in those without 
capacity.  This is important to consider 
when assessing the net fiscal impact of 
proposed new housing developments. 
 
* this was operationalized by the presence of 
a lower district level enrollment in Academic 
Year (AY) 13/14 than in AY 03/04, and a 
district level student-teacher ratio below the 
state average in AY 13/14.   
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General Laws Chapters 40R and 40S6 (when properly funded) were designed in part for this 
purpose.  However, as currently written they essentially accept the false premise that new 
housing developments always create a net negative fiscal cost for cities and towns and that 
communities must be “paid off” in order to accept new developments. 
A more effective policy would guarantee payments if a community that developed 
housing that met a regional or statewide need, but the development had a demonstrable net 
negative fiscal impact on the community. This would ensure that the Commonwealth was not 
paying communities to create housing that would have been developed anyway and would make 
a real difference for communities that were truly fiscally burdened by new housing development. 
Significantly, it would eliminate a major obstacle to the development of much needed new 
housing in Massachusetts. This working paper explores the feasibility of such a policy by 
expanding on the results of previous studies on the actual fiscal and economic impacts of new 
housing in Massachusetts. Using these studies as a starting point, we investigated whether the 
economic and fiscal benefits of new housing that accrue to the state government could support a 
dedicated, as-of-right local-aid funding stream for communities that can demonstrate actual net 
negative fiscal impacts. 
 
                                                 
6 See https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVII/Chapter40R and 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartI/TitleVII/Chapter40S 
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The state and local fiscal benefits of new housing development in Massachusetts 
Over the past decade, a number of studies have been conducted that directly examine the 
economic and fiscal impact of housing development in Massachusetts at the state and local 
level.7 Significantly, these studies are based on the actual fiscal experiences of Massachusetts 
communities and use state-of-the-art approaches to model the economic activity and fiscal 
impacts associated with new housing developments. 
Presently, the Commonwealth’s local aid funding formula is not growth neutral. In other 
words, it does not reward municipalities with additional funding when they develop new 
housing, even though it can generate positive statewide economic impacts. Consequently, local 
debates over the fiscal impact of proposed new housing developments typically only consider 
expected local tax receipts when considering municipal costs and benefits. As will be 
demonstrated below, the construction of new housing generates significant tax revenue at both 
the local and state level. 
In their 2010 analysis of the economic impact of Chapter 40B developments, Koshgarian 
et al. 8 found that: 
•  Between 2000 and 2010, 21,861 housing units were constructed (8,140 of which  
 qualified as “affordable”). 
 
•  The development of these new units required over $5 billion in direct spending, 
 which supported over 20,000 jobs. 
 
•  The direct spending on these developments spurred just under $4 billion in    
  additional economic activity and supported an additional 27,475 jobs. 
 
                                                 
7 Op.cit, Nakajima et. al. (2007); Nakosteen et. al (2003); Koshgarian et.al. (2009), Koshgarian et. al. Economic 
Contributions of Housing Permitted through Chapter 40B (2010), and Burnet et.al. Benefits and Costs of Increasing 
Housing Production in Massachusetts. Abt & Associates (2012)  
8 Op.cit.  
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• The residents of these new units directly spent an estimated $1.86 billion, which spurred 
over $600 million in additional spending.  Overall, the direct and indirect spending of the 
residents of 40B units supported an estimated 11,587 jobs in Massachusetts. 
 
• While local property tax revenues averaged an estimated $2,825 per unit, when one 
considers the multiplier effect of household spending, the estimated average state sales 
and income tax receipts per unit were $1,043 and $4,313 respectively (or $5,356 in total 
state tax payments). 
 
These findings demonstrate that even though the costs associated with many of the public 
services delivered to new residents are borne by municipalities, there are also significant tax 
revenue benefits generated by the average 40B unit accrue to state government.9 However, a 
closer look at the marginal added costs of providing local services to new residents in these 
developments is warranted given that Massachusetts school districts spent an average of $14,021 
per pupil in 201310 and that the average 40B unit generates an estimated average state and local 
tax payment of only $8,181.   
 
The local fiscal costs and benefits of new housing development in Massachusetts 
 
In 2007, the UMass Donahue Institute (UMDI) conducted a detailed retrospective analysis11 
of eight 40B developments12 in different regions across the Commonwealth. A primary purpose 
of this study was to evaluate whether communities with these developments were spending more 
on municipal services for their new residents than they received in local tax receipts. The eight 
                                                 
9 There is every reason to believe that an analysis of non-40B housing developments would reveal a similarly 
disproportionate split of total tax benefits but, thanks to their higher property tax valuations and higher income 
residents, the total tax receipts would likely be higher. 
10 See http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/profiles/finance.aspx?orgcode=00000000&orgtypecode=0& 
11 Nakajima, E., Modzelewski, K., & Dale, A. (2007, May). The fiscal impact of mixed-income housing 
development on Massachusetts municipalities: A report for Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association. Hadley, 
MA: Donahue Institute, University of Massachusetts. Retrieved from 
http://www.massbenchmarks.org/publications/studies/pdf/UMDI_FiscalImpact.pdf 
12 According to the authors they, “randomly selected 20 communities out of a possible 100 cities and towns that met 
our selection criteria” (page 4).  These criteria included, size, region, and the presence of relevant developments 
under construction between 1990 and 2003.  For more detail see Nakajima, et.al, 2007.   
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developments they examined are described in the following table, which is taken from the 
original study (page 5). 
Figure 2 
 
The UMDI analysis relied on a number of different local and state data sources and extensive 
fieldwork in selected communities. As they describe it, they: 
…used a case study approach to analyze the historical fiscal impact of mixed-
income homeownership developments constructed in Massachusetts during the 
past fifteen years…UMDI collected complete information for eight developments 
located in seven towns. The fieldwork for the project was conducted over the 
course of six months and included a mixture of interviews, primary data 
collection from municipal records and the use of online state databases. The 
interviews included local school and town officials while the data included school 
enrollment data by project and household, individual assessor’s records, special 
permit decisions, municipal census records and public safety data. State data 
included expenditure and revenue data from the Massachusetts Department of  
Revenue, and educational data from the Massachusetts Department of Education 
(Nakajima, et.al, 2007, page 4).  
 
UMDI researchers used these various sources of data to systematically evaluate the fiscal 
impact of each of the eight developments examined using three alternative methods: 
• The per-capita method - Which assumes the cost of the local services each new 
resident receives is equal to the average cost per community resident. 
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• The marginal cost method - Which relies upon data obtained from and interviews 
with municipal and school department officials to arrive at a customized estimate of 
the costs of delivering services to the development’s residents. 
 
• The “fair share” method:  A novel approach developed by the authors which, 
“allocates municipal expenditures equally to each housing unit in town based on the 
proposition that every household has an equal stake, either as a resident, current or 
future consumer of town services, in the provision of town services” (page 22)13.  
 
As expected the magnitudes of the impacts varied depending on the method used. It is 
noteworthy that in some cases the net impact was financially positive while in others it was net 
negative. In all cases, the overall fiscal impact of these individual developments, whether 
positive or negative, was modest. 
The UMDI study also underscores the critical importance of thoughtful planning as a tool 
for balancing community and regional needs against the fiscal constraints facing Massachusetts’ 
cities and towns. This includes consideration of the mix of affordable and market-rate units and 
the size of the new units, with respect to the number of bedrooms. As Nakajima et al.(2007) 
concluded: 
The fiscal potential of mixed-income developments is that the market-rate units 
within a project can contribute sufficient property tax revenue to offset the 
negative impact of affordable housing units. As this study shows, fiscal balance 
can likely be achieved in many projects. The extension of this point is that 
proposed projects throughout a community may be able to achieve fiscal balance 
in the aggregate. An affordable or workforce housing development located in one 
neighborhood may have a negative fiscal impact that is offset by luxury housing 
in another neighborhood. A transit-oriented development in the center of town 
may contain a mix of commercial and residential construction that offsets the 
fiscal impact of scattered site development in the community (page 18). 
  
                                                 
13 This approach recognizes that municipal service costs are not allocated to residents on a fee for service basis (e.g., 
all property owners must help underwrite educational costs even if they do not have students attending the schools).  
It also highlights the reality that, in many communities, local property taxes for many existing homes generate lower 
tax receipts than their “fair share” of municipal costs.  In practice, in many communities, high value residential and 
commercial property taxpayers pay well in excess of their “fair share”.  Thus, in a very real sense, a minority of 
existing taxpayers subsidize local services enjoyed by both long-time community members and new residents. 
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Do state tax impacts offset local marginal costs? 
 
While the UMDI study (Nakajima et al., 2007) offers us a number of important insights 
into the practical fiscal realities and planning implications for cities and towns considering new 
housing developments, it only considered the local tax receipts generated by the developments 
and not the associated tax benefits that accrue to the state government. 
As noted earlier, Koshgarian et al. (2010) demonstrated that the state’s share of the 
economic and tax impacts of the over 21,000 40B units constructed between 2000 and 2010 can 
be substantial. This suggests that on the whole, the overall net benefits of new housing 
developments are positive when state fiscal impacts are considered. To test this proposition, we 
revisited the eight UMDI communities and used an input-output approach to estimate the state-
level tax impacts for the developments studied by Nakajima et.al (2007).  
Housing unit values were based on 2005 assessed values rather than sales prices, which 
allowed for temporal consistency. Two developments (Fresh Pond Farms and Edgemoor Circle) 
were excluded from our analysis because historical unit-level assessment data were unavailable.  
The remaining developments that we examined included: Kendall Crescent in Brookline, Nickey 
Lane in Falmouth, Pine’s Edge in Northampton, Stoneybrook in Peabody, Sherwood Forest in 
Sandwich, and Buckingham Estates in Wilmington. 
We then estimated the household income of the residents of these developments. This 
income is the critical input to the model and it is the basis upon which estimates of household 
spending and associated sales tax, income tax, and state fee collection are developed. Housing 
units that are designated as “affordable” under Chapter 40B are limited to residents with income 
no higher than 80 percent of the HUD Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) median for the 
applicable household size. Therefore, we assumed for the analysis that households in affordable 
  
10 
 
units earn 80 percent of area median income, adjusted by household size using data from the 
Nakajima (2007). This allowed us to estimate the aggregate household incomes of the residents 
of the affordable units in each of the developments we examined. 
Estimates of the household incomes of residents of market-rate units were derived from 
the assessed property values. Sales prices for affordable units in 40B projects are set assuming a 
five percent down payment and monthly housing costs of no more than 30 percent of income.  
We used these criteria for estimating income in market-rate units. To estimate the monthly 
housing cost, we used the maximum and minimum assessment values for each development, the 
annual average interest rate offered by Freddie Mac (5.87 percent) in 2005, a five percent down 
payment, and an assumed 30-year term, which were inputted into Freddie Mac’s online mortgage 
calculator.14 These housing cost figures were used to calculate the associated monthly income, 
using the constraint that housing costs may not exceed 30 percent of household income. These 
monthly income values were translated into annual income values. The midpoints of the annual 
incomes for market units were multiplied by the number of units in the development. The result 
was our estimated aggregate household income for market-rate households in each development. 
We used IMPLAN’s input-output model15 to estimate the annual tax impacts of the 
expenditures of 40B and market-rate households. The IMPLAN model allowed us to organize 
the income data by household income bracket in order to systematically account for important 
differences in the spending, saving, and tax paying behavior of households at different income 
levels. Household incomes ranged from $48,309.06 to $140,704.60, and the aggregate income 
                                                 
14 http://calculators.freddiemac.com/response/lf-freddiemac/calc/home02  
15 For more information, see http://implan.com/ 
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entered into the IMPLAN model was just under $19.8 million.16 Incomes were adjusted for 
inflation from 2005 to 2013 dollars prior to inclusion in the IMPLAN model.  
Figure 3: IMPLAN Inputs (Annual 2013 Dollars) 
IMPLAN Bracket Bracket Income Range Total Annual Income of Development Residents (2013 dollars) 
1 $10,000 to $15,000 0 
2 $15,000 to $25,000 0 
3 $25,000 to $35,000 0 
4 $35,000 to $50,000 $289,854.36 
5 $50,000 to $75,000 $4,471,939.53 
6 $75,000 to $100,000 $8,209,270.90 
7 $100,000 to $150,000 $6,810,479.44 
8 More than $150,000 0 
 
The IMPLAN model generated estimates of annual state tax impacts including revenue from the 
state’s income tax, sales tax, licenses (motor vehicle, fishing and hunting), fines and fees. As can 
be seen in Figure 4, aggregate state tax impacts were an estimated $563,721.00 or an average of 
$2,516.61 in state tax payments per unit. Note that outputs were adjusted back to 2005 dollars.   
  
                                                 
16 Estimated total aggregate income totaled $19,781,544.23. 
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Figure 4: IMPLAN Outputs (Annual 2005 Dollars) 
 
Description 
Tax on 
Production and 
Imports Households Corporations 
Category Total 
(2005 dollars) 
Dividends N/A N/A $2,243 $2,243.00 
Sales Tax $238,250 N/A N/A $238,250.00 
Motor Vehicle License $5,283 N/A N/A $5,283.00 
Severance Tax N/A N/A N/A $0.00 
Other Taxes $31,785 N/A N/A $31,785.00 
NonTaxes $873 N/A N/A $873.00 
Corporate Profits Tax N/A N/A $65,509 $65,509.00 
Personal Tax: Income Tax N/A $198,142 N/A $198,142.00 
Personal Tax: NonTaxes 
(Fines/Fees) N/A $16,314 N/A $16,314.00 
Personal Tax: Motor Vehicle 
License N/A $4,776 N/A $4,776.00 
Personal Tax: Other Tax 
(Fish/Hunt) N/A $546 N/A $546.00 
Total State Tax Impact $276,191 $219,778 $67,752 $563,721.00  
 
 
As we suspected, the estimates of the state tax impacts associated with the examined 
developments are significantly higher than the fair share costs of providing local services to the 
residents of these new developments, as estimated by Nakajima et al. (2007). In fact, these 
estimates imply that just under 8 percent of the state tax benefits associated with residents in 
these developments would be required to make the three communities that experienced financial 
losses (Falmouth, Sandwich, and Wilmington) financially whole (see Figure 5). 
  
 
Figure 5: Development Impacts (in 2005 dollars) 
 
 
However, in practice not every new housing unit is occupied by a net new resident of the 
state. An analysis of county-to-county migration data17 revealed that, on average, 25 percent of 
new Massachusetts residents originate from out-of-state locations. To help ensure that our tax 
revenue estimates reflected net new revenues to the state, we discounted the total state revenue 
estimated by the IMPLAN model by 75 percent. This resulted in a much more conservative 
estimate of net new state revenue of $140,930. Notably, even at this reduced level, the net 
negative fiscal impacts documented by Nakajima et al. (2007) in three of their study 
communities represents only 31 percent of the total net new state tax revenue generated by the 6 
developments we analyzed. In other words, the local tax revenue shortfall experienced by some 
communities could have been offset by the redirection of a portion of the state’s net new tax 
receipts on aggregate. While the present analysis does not allow comparison of the new state 
revenue to new state costs, it does suggest that the net impact of new developments, when state 
revenue is considered, is substantially more positive than typically assumed.    
 
  
                                                 
17 2008-2012 American Community Survey: County-to-County Migration Flows. Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/acs/county-to-county.html 
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Policy Implications 
The results of our analysis are consistent with the claim that new housing developments 
in Massachusetts can have positive fiscal impacts when state tax benefits are considered. Further, 
our reconsideration of six of the eight communities examined by Nakajima et al. (2007) 
demonstrates that in the aggregate, these new developments can generate considerably more state 
tax revenue than any actual local revenue shortfalls associated with those projects. Given the 
positive state tax impacts, community resistance to housing development can result in a lost 
opportunity to generate much needed state tax revenue, while preventing the Commonwealth 
from meeting pressing regional and statewide housing needs.   
Our analysis also suggests that development planning should consider the capacity of the 
local school district to absorb new students. This would limit the chance that a community would 
approve housing developments that exceed its service capacity, resulting in net negative local 
fiscal impacts. Appendix A contains a preliminary assessment of the average number of school-
age children associated with housing developments of different sizes, number of bedrooms, and 
price ranges in Massachusetts. These were developed as a helpful planning tool by using a 
modified analytical approach originally developed by scholars at Rutgers University in 2006.18  
Additionally, this analysis does not address the potential for the unexpected and 
substantial costs associated with providing services to school-age children with special 
educational and other needs, which is often a concern for smaller communities. In some cases, 
the risks associated with the potential for new high-need students may deter some communities 
                                                 
18 Listokin, D., Voicu, I., Dolphin, W., & Camp, M. (2006, August). New Jersey Demographic Multipliers: The 
profile of the occupants of residential and nonresidential development. New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy 
Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Retrived from 
http://www.state.nj.us/state/planning/publications/178-nj-demo-multipliers.pdf 
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from supporting new residential developments, even when the community has the capacity to 
serve more average new residents. 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that the net new state tax revenue generated by local mixed-
income housing offsets any net negative fiscal burdens to communities. A state policy that 
dedicates a portion of this revenue to such communities could alleviate some of the hesitancy to 
permit new housing developments, helping to meet regional or state needs. These findings also 
suggest that incentives and technical assistance encouraging more thoughtful and evidence-based 
planning could limit the state and local fiscal impacts of new housing developments. It is 
possible that careful planning could result in enough net new revenue to support the 
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establishment of a “circuit breaker” program to reduce the local financial risk associated serving 
new high-need students, but further research is needed to systematically answer this question. 
While new state policies along these lines may not eliminate all local resistance to new 
housing development, they could help to address widespread local concern about these 
developments. Given the critical importance of new and more affordable housing to the 
Commonwealth’s continued economic competitiveness, state policymakers should consider 
developing new policies that dedicate a portion of the new tax revenue they receive to an “as of 
right” fund.19 Doing so would help to ensure that communities who approve developments that 
meet state and regional housing needs have access to state financial support when they find 
themselves with a demonstrable fiscal burden as a result. It would also begin to eliminate a 
significant and perverse disincentive to the approval of housing development and help close the 
substantial gap that exists between local interests and state and regional housing needs. 
 
 
  
                                                 
19 Given that previous attempts to address this problem (e.g., MGL Chapters 40R and 40S) are not always fully 
funded and do not appear to be inducing new development in a substantial way, any new fund should entitle eligible 
communities to support without the uncertainty associated with the annual appropriation process.  Doing so would 
substantially increase the level of trust that communities who have previously been reluctant to participate in these 
types of programs and could be expected to increase participation. 
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Appendix A: Residential Multipliers 
Estimates of the Average Number of School-Age Children per Housing Unit by Type 
          Housing Value Tertile 1: $0-$260,000  
Grades: Nursery School/Preschool - 5 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 
3-4 
apts 
5-9 
apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0306 0.0231 0.0324 0.0233 0.0370 0.0251 0.0333 0.0277 
2 0.1032 0.1320 0.1952 0.1814 0.1992 0.2158 0.1778 0.1637 
3 0.2653 0.2800 0.3505 0.4233 0.5320 0.5065 0.3844 0.5379 
4 0.3309 0.4319 0.3638 0.4962 0.7438 NA NA NA 
5 0.3715 0.2622 0.2271 0.3254 NA NA NA NA 
Grades: 6 - 12 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 
3-4 
apts 
5-9 
apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0246 0.0214 0.0231 0.0203 0.0170 0.0075 0.0165 0.0122 
2 0.0884 0.0954 0.1247 0.1428 0.1256 0.1308 0.1199 0.1179 
3 0.2558 0.2838 0.3970 0.4308 0.4484 0.3903 0.1707 0.3069 
4 0.3934 0.6069 0.3996 0.6279 0.6488 NA NA NA 
5 0.4730 0.4081 0.5878 0.3237 NA NA NA NA 
          Housing Value Tertile 2: $260,000 - $402,116 
Grades: Nursery School/Preschool - 5 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 
3-4 
apts 
5-9 
apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0117 0.0189 0.0053 0.0212 0.0108 0.0144 0.0099 0.0066 
2 0.0926 0.1680 0.1240 0.1804 0.2298 0.1919 0.1925 0.1504 
3 0.1998 0.3917 0.3067 0.3964 0.6599 0.6302 0.6402 0.5627 
4 0.2748 0.4186 0.3318 0.6385 0.8270 0.8926 0.3250 NA 
5 0.3050 0.5833 0.2264 0.2471 NA NA NA NA 
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Grades: 6 - 12 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 
3-4 
apts 
5-9 
apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0291 0.0083 0.0051 0.0161 0.0194 0.0111 0.0162 0.0059 
2 0.0883 0.0959 0.1219 0.1330 0.1461 0.1441 0.1059 0.0884 
3 0.2385 0.3430 0.3949 0.4273 0.5713 0.7241 NA NA 
4 0.3688 0.7960 0.3675 0.7655 0.9258 NA NA NA 
5 0.5122 0.4759 0.3974 0.4471 NA NA NA NA 
          Housing Value Tertile 3: $402,116 or more 
Grades: Nursery School/Preschool - 5 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 
3-4 
apts 
5-9 
apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0231 0.0170 0.0118 0.0192 0.0056 0.0133 0.0171 0.0086 
2 0.1177 0.1491 0.1467 0.1237 0.1231 0.1819 0.1311 0.1301 
3 0.2974 0.3541 0.3083 0.3393 0.2920 0.3540 0.4539 0.2075 
4 0.4410 0.4041 0.3410 0.4078 0.3684 NA NA NA 
5 0.4902 0.2943 0.3005 0.4130 NA NA NA NA 
Grades: 6 - 12 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 
3-4 
apts 
5-9 
apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0166 0.0152 0.0144 0.0184 0.0138 NA 0.0037 0.0070 
2 0.0962 0.0935 0.0961 0.0818 0.0995 0.0971 0.0734 0.0710 
3 0.2816 0.2569 0.3470 0.3200 0.2644 0.5543 0.2147 0.3257 
4 0.4504 0.3279 0.2845 0.5004 0.3741 NA NA NA 
5 0.5515 0.2755 0.3642 0.4173 NA NA NA NA 
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Upper Bound of the Estimates of the Average Number of School-Age Children per Housing 
Unit by Type 
          Housing Value Tertile 1: $0-$260,000  
Grades: Nursery School/Preschool - 5 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 3-4 apts 5-9 apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0306 0.0231 0.0324 0.0233 0.0370 0.0251 0.0333 0.0277 
2 0.1032 0.1320 0.1952 0.1814 0.1992 0.2158 0.1778 0.1637 
3 0.2653 0.2800 0.3505 0.4233 0.5320 0.5065 0.3844 0.5379 
4 0.3309 0.4319 0.3638 0.4962 0.7438 NA NA NA 
5 0.3715 0.2622 0.2271 0.3254 NA NA NA NA 
Grades: 6 - 12 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 3-4 apts 5-9 apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0246 0.0214 0.0231 0.0203 0.0170 0.0075 0.0165 0.0122 
2 0.0884 0.0954 0.1247 0.1428 0.1256 0.1308 0.1199 0.1179 
3 0.2558 0.2838 0.3970 0.4308 0.4484 0.3903 0.1707 0.3069 
4 0.3934 0.6069 0.3996 0.6279 0.6488 NA NA NA 
5 0.4730 0.4081 0.5878 0.3237 NA NA NA NA 
          Housing Value Tertile 2: $260,000 - $402,116 
Grades: Nursery School/Preschool - 5 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 3-4 apts 5-9 apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0117 0.0189 0.0053 0.0212 0.0108 0.0144 0.0099 0.0066 
2 0.0926 0.1680 0.1240 0.1804 0.2298 0.1919 0.1925 0.1504 
3 0.1998 0.3917 0.3067 0.3964 0.6599 0.6302 0.6402 0.5627 
4 0.2748 0.4186 0.3318 0.6385 0.8270 0.8926 0.3250 NA 
5 0.3050 0.5833 0.2264 0.2471 NA NA NA NA 
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Grades: 6 - 12 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 3-4 apts 5-9 apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0291 0.0083 0.0051 0.0161 0.0194 0.0111 0.0162 0.0059 
2 0.0883 0.0959 0.1219 0.1330 0.1461 0.1441 0.1059 0.0884 
3 0.2385 0.3430 0.3949 0.4273 0.5713 0.7241 NA NA 
4 0.3688 0.7960 0.3675 0.7655 0.9258 NA NA NA 
5 0.5122 0.4759 0.3974 0.4471 NA NA NA NA 
          Housing Value Tertile 3: $402,116 or more 
Grades: Nursery School/Preschool - 5 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 3-4 apts 5-9 apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0231 0.0170 0.0118 0.0192 0.0056 0.0133 0.0171 0.0086 
2 0.1177 0.1491 0.1467 0.1237 0.1231 0.1819 0.1311 0.1301 
3 0.2974 0.3541 0.3083 0.3393 0.2920 0.3540 0.4539 0.2075 
4 0.4410 0.4041 0.3410 0.4078 0.3684 NA NA NA 
5 0.4902 0.2943 0.3005 0.4130 NA NA NA NA 
Grades: 6 - 12 
   
Number of Units in Building 
  
  
One-Family 
Detached 
One-Family 
Attached 2 apts 3-4 apts 5-9 apts 
10-19 
apts 
20-49 
apts 
50 or 
more 
apts 
N
um
be
r o
f 
Be
dr
oo
m
s 
1 0.0166 0.0152 0.0144 0.0184 0.0138 NA 0.0037 0.0070 
2 0.0962 0.0935 0.0961 0.0818 0.0995 0.0971 0.0734 0.0710 
3 0.2816 0.2569 0.3470 0.3200 0.2644 0.5543 0.2147 0.3257 
4 0.4504 0.3279 0.2845 0.5004 0.3741 NA NA NA 
5 0.5515 0.2755 0.3642 0.4173 NA NA NA NA 
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Comments on the Use of These Multipliers 
To obtain an estimate of the population impact of development, multiply the appropriate 
multiplier by the number of units of that type. Comparison of the “demographic multipliers” 
contained in Appendix A illustrates how important unit characteristics can be when attempting to 
predict the likely local impact of new housing developments. 
While the use of state averages to estimate likely population and fiscal impacts can be 
very useful, these multipliers can mask significant variation at the local level and result in 
imprecise forecasts. Using the data contained in Appendix A, we compared the actual number of 
school-age children in three of the six case communities20 examined by Nakajima et.al (2007) to 
the number predicted by statewide averages. In two cases (Sherwood Forest in Sandwich and 
Buckingham Estates in Wilmington) our demographic multipliers predicted 17 and 13 school-
age children respectively (within confidence intervals that had upper bounds of 23 and 17).  In 
actuality, these two developments were home to 40 and 23 school-age children, significantly 
more than predicted. In the third case (Edgemoor Circle in Wellesley) the actual number of 
school-age children residing in the development was 4, well under the predicted number of 9 
(with an upper bound estimate of 10). 
 
                                                 
20 The other three communities were not examined because we did not have information on the size of the units (in 
bedrooms).  
